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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott**
William B. Shearer III*"
and J. Haskell Murray....
INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
limited liability company, partnership, agency, and joint venture law
decided during the survey period' by the Georgia Supreme Court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.2 This Article also summarizes enactments at the 2007 Session
of the Georgia General Assembly to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") with respect to banking, finance, commerce,
corporation, partnership, and associations laws.'

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University
(B.A., cum laude, 1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 1988). Member, Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Southern Methodist
University (B.B.A., cum laude, 1996); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., 1999). Member, Mercer Law Review (1997-1999). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Rhodes College
(B.A., 2003); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2006).
Member, Georgia State University Law Review (2004-2006); Student Writing Editor (20052006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. The survey period runs from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007.
2. See infra Parts I, II,and III.
3. See infra Part IV.
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CORPORATIONS

FiduciaryDuties

1. The Georgia Business Corporation Code and the Business
Judgment Rule Protect Officers and Directors Against Claims of
OrdinaryNegligence.
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court
of Appeals, in Flexible Products Co. v. Ervast,4 held that the business
judgment rule and sections of the Georgia Business Corporation Code5
protect officers and directors of Georgia corporations against liability for
ordinary negligence as a matter of'law.6 In this case, Roger Ervast sued
his former employer, Flexible Products Co. ("FPC"), and two of its
officers for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to inform him of FPC's
merger discussions with Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") before Ervast
sold his FPC stock back to the company.7
In September 1999 Dow contacted and met with FPC executives to
discuss acquiring FPC.' In early October 1999, Dow and FPC entered
a confidentiality agreement, and on October 26, 1999, Dow "telephonically offered a price that [FPC] was willing to consider."9 FPC set October
26, 1999 as the date on which negotiations became "material" ° and
"paid all shareholders who sold their shares after that date the higher
merger price per share."1' Ervast had sold his FPC shares on October
4, 1999 and October 11, 1999, and therefore received the lower premerger price.' 2 Arguing that FPC should have informed him of the
merger discussions before he sold his shares, Ervast sued FPC and
sought "the difference between his stock's pre- and post-merger values"
and attorney fees.13

4. 284 Ga. App. 178, 643 S.E.2d 560 (2007).
5. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830(a), -830(d), -842(a), -842(d) (2003 & Supp. 2007).
6. Flexible Prods. Co., 284 Ga. App. at 182, 643 S.E.2d at 564-65.
7. Id. at 178, 643 S.E.2d at 562.
8. Id. at 179, 643 S.E.2d at 562-63.
9. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 563.
10. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the date on which merger
discussions became "material" was (1) a mixed question of law and fact, (2) not admissible
as opinion evidence by Ervast's expert who testified at the trial court that October 1, 1999
was the date that discussions between FPC and Dow became material, and (3) a question
that should be decided by the fact-finder, which was, in this case, the jury. Id. at 180-81,
643 S.E.2d at 564.
11. Id. at 179, 643 S.E.2d at 563.
12. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 562.
13. Id. at 178, 643 S.E.2d at 562.
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At trial, the jury found that FPC and its officers had breached their
fiduciary duties to Ervast and awarded Ervast $2,729,691 in damages.14 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial
court should have granted FPC's motion for directed verdict on Ervast's
claim of ordinary negligence because "Georgia's business judgment rule
relieves officers and directors from liability for acts or omissions taken
in good faith compliance with their corporate duties.""5 The case of
Flexible ProductsCo., while only providing a very brief discussion on the
issue of standard of care, is still noteworthy because it is the first case
to hold that officers and directors of Georgia corporations will be
protected against claims of ordinary negligence in the performance of
their duties on behalf of their respective corporations. 6
Without
expressly holding as such, by protecting Georgia officers and directors
against liability for ordinary negligence, the court of appeals has
effectively adopted a gross negligence standard of care, similar to the
standard of care recognized by Delaware courts for over twenty years.'7
2. Georgia Courts Recognize a Claim for Aiding and Abetting
a Breach of Fiduciary Duty. In Insight Technology, Inc. v. FreightCheck, LLC, s the court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and held that while Georgia courts had never recognized a claim
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in the past, Insight
Technology, Inc. ("Insight") could maintain such a claim under O.C.G.A.
section 51-12-30,"9 which covers the inducement of actions as joint
wrongdoers. ° Insight brought multiple claims against (1) Darren
Brewer, Insight's former president, (2) GetLoaded.com, LLC ("GetLoaded"), an Insight competitor, (3) Patrick Hull, the majority shareholder of
GetLoaded, and (4) FreightCheck, LLC, a company created by Brewer
and Hull (collectively, the "Defendants").' Insight alleged that Brewer

14. Id.
15. Id. at 182, 643 S.E.2d at 564.
16. See id., 643 S.E.2d at 564-65. The notes to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-830 state that the
Georgia statute does not codify the business judgment rule and that "[tihe elements of the
business judgment rule and the circumstances for its application are continuing to be
developed by the courts." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 cmt.
17. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
18. 280 Ga. App. 19, 633 S.E.2d 373 (2006).
19. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30 (2000).
20. Insight, 280 Ga. App. at 23-24, 633 S.E.2d at 377-78. O.C.G.A. section 51-12-30
reads in full: "In all cases, a person who maliciously procures an injury to be done to
another, whether an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer and may
be subject to an action either alone or jointly with the person who actually committed the
injury." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30.
21. Insight, 280 Ga. App. at 19, 21, 633 S.E.2d at 375, 376.
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and Hull used Insight's software, pricing, website design, and other
business information in forming FreightCheck while Brewer was still
employed by Insight. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the claim that Hull, GetLoaded, and FreightCheck aided and abetted Brewer in his alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
In granting the motion, the trial court stated that Georgia courts have
never recognized such a claim.22
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. 23 Citing
Rome Industries, Inc. v. Jonsson,2 4 the court in Insight discussed how
Georgia courts have held a defendant liable for assisting in a breach of
fiduciary duty under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-30 and tortious interference
with contractual rights. 25 The court in Rome Industries stated that
"[t]he fiduciary relationship between a corporation and its officer arises
out of the contractual or employment relationship between the two
parties" and, thus, aiding in a breach of fiduciary duty is tantamount to
tortious interference with contractual rights. 26 The court in Insight
noted that "there is 'no magic in mere nomenclature.' ,27 The court held
that "'aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty,' 'procuring a breach
of fiduciary duty,' or 'tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship"' are all different names for a viable claim under Georgia law and
may entitle a plaintiff to recovery upon proof that:
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege,
the defendant acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer's
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) with knowledge that the primary

wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant acted
purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's
wrongful conduct procured a breach of the primary wrongdoer's
fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct proximately
caused damage to the plaintiff."
The significance of Insight is even more noteworthy in light of the fact
that two federal courts, interpreting Georgia law, dismissed claims based

22. Id. at 20-23, 633 S.E.2d at 375-77 (citing Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Ga., 268 Ga. App. 659, 664-65, 602 S.E.2d 219, 224 (2004)).
23. Id. at 23-24, 633 S.E.2d at 377-78.
24. 202 Ga. App. 682, 415 S.E.2d 651 (1992).
25. Insight, 280 Ga. App. at 24-25, 633 S.E.2d at 378.
26. Rome Indus., 202 Ga. App. at 683, 415 S.E.2d at 652.
27. Insight, 280 Ga. App. at 23, 633 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Guth v. Walker, 92 Ga. App.
490, 494, 88 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1955)).
28. Id. at 25-26, 633 S.E.2d at 379 (footnotes omitted).
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on theories of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty just a few
months prior to this decision.29
3. The Fine Line Between Active Solicitation of Customers and
Mere Preparation for Competition Determines Breach of
Fiduciary Duty. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, in Impreglon, Inc. v. Newco Enterprises, Inc.,"
added color to the line between an officer's mere preparation for
competition, which is not a breach of fiduciary duty under Georgia law,
and an officer's active solicitation of customers, which is a breach."
Newco Enterprises, Inc. ("NEI") outsourced its surface coating of metal
and other materials to Impreglon, Inc.32 Curt Jarrell, while serving as
Impreglon's CEO, entered into negotiations with NEI regarding
numerous topics, including employment, potential lease options, and the
formation of a new company to compete with Impreglon.3 3 The court
held that even though there had been extensive negotiations between
Jarrell and NEI, the discussions did not result in a breach of fiduciary
duty.34 Moreover, the court noted that under Georgia law, an officer
could even purchase a competing business while employed by a rival
company without breaching his or her fiduciary duties.35
However, the court granted Impreglon's summary judgment motion on
its breach of fiduciary duty claim against Jarrell based on one additional
significant factor-his active solicitation of Impreglon's customers and
his receipt of specific, written assurances that NEI, and not Impreglon,
would receive future business from those customers.36 The district

29. See generally Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437
F.3d 1145, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006); Laddin v. Edwards, No. 1:02-CV-3327-TWT, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30356, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2006) (holding that Georgia courts have not
recognized claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
30. No. 1:05-CV-2563-RWS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23640 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2007).
31. See id. at *16-21; see also KEG Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1376
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that mere preparation to compete does not rise to the level of a
breach of fiduciary duty).
32. Impreglon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23640, at *7.
33. Id. at *20-21.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *21 (citing Gresham & Assocs., Inc. v. Strianese, 265 Ga. App. 559, 560-61,
595 S.E.2d 82, 84 (2004)). In Gresham & Assocs., the court held that
"[an officer] is entitled to make arrangements to compete [and] can properly
purchase a rival business and upon termination of employment immediately
compete." But during the term of employment with the corporation, the officer
may not solicit customers for a competing company or otherwise engage in direct
competition with the corporation's business.
265 Ga. App. at 560-61, 595 S.E.2d at 84-85 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
36. See Impreglon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23640, at *21-23.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

court in Impreglon reiterated the core concern in fiduciary duty analysis:
that a corporate officer such as Jarrell may not appropriate "the
business opportunities of the corporation."3 7 While the court did not
provide much additional color in this case on what, outside of solicitation
of customers, would rise to the level of impermissible appropriation of
business opportunities, the court stated that "brief, nonspecific, and
strictly hypothetical" inquiries into whether a customer would place
orders with an officer if he or she left his or her employer, would not rise
to the level of a breach of fiduciary duty.'8
B. Strict Scrutiny Applied to an Employment Agreement Signed
Separately from (but Concurrently with) a Sale of Business Agreement
The Georgia Court of Appeals, in Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of
Atlanta v. Holley 9 held that (1) strict scrutiny review should be
applied to restrictive covenant language in an employment agreement
that differed from a sale of business agreement executed by the parties
on the same day; (2) under strict scrutiny review, a restriction against
"'accepting an entreaty' from known or prospective customers is overly
broad and unenforceable"; (3) Georgia law does not recognize the blue
pencil doctrine when dealing with restrictive covenants in employment
contracts; and (4) because of the lack of availability of the blue pencil
doctrine, the court may not amend the restrictive covenants in the
employment agreement, and therefore, the agreement is unenforceable.4" Under Georgia law, courts analyze restrictive covenants under
three levels of scrutiny: (1) strict scrutiny for employment contracts, (2)
a lesser, middle scrutiny for professional partnership agreements, and
(3) a much lower scrutiny for sale of business agreements.4 '
In Hilb Hugh Holley signed an Agreement of Merger and a separate
employment contract with Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Company of Atlanta
("HRH") pursuant to the sale of Holley's insurance agency to HRH.4
The court refused to analyze Holley's employment contract under the
much lower standard used for sale of business agreements, even though:
(1) Holley signed the employment agreement on the same day as the
merger agreement; (2) the execution of the employment agreement was

37. Id. at "18.
38. Id. at *22 (citing Nilan's Alley, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 208 Ga. App. 145, 145, 430 S.E.2d
368, 369 (1993)).
39. 284 Ga. App. 591, 644 S.E.2d 862 (2007).
40. Id. at 595-96, 644 S.E.2d at 866-67 (quoting Pregler v. C&Z, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 149,
150, 575 S.E.2d 915, 916 (2003)).
41. Id. at 595, 644 S.E.2d at 866.
42. See id. at 591-95, 644 S.E.2d at 864-66.
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a condition precedent under the merger agreement; and (3) the
restrictive covenant language in the merger agreement expressly stated
that "'this covenant is in addition to any covenants which [Holley] may
make in any employment or other agreements executed or to be executed
with Surviving Corporation.' ''43 The court in Hilb held that "when
parties execute separate contracts for the seller's sale of the business
and the seller's subsequent employment and each contract contains
different restrictive covenants, the restrictive4 4 covenants in the employment contract are subject to strict scrutiny."
In Hilb the Agreement of Merger restricted Holley from competing
directly or indirectly with the buyer of his business for five years, while
the employment agreement contained different restrictions including
language preventing Holley from contacting, soliciting, or "'accept[ing]
an entreaty from"' a known or prospective customer. 4' The court of
appeals in Hilb held the employment agreement invalid because the
"'accept[ing]an entreaty from"' language was overly broad and because
Georgia courts do not employ the blue pencil doctrine to modify overly
broad employment agreements.46 This holding highlights the importance of integrating the most restrictive of the restrictive covenant
language (or simply mirroring the restrictive covenant language) that
may otherwise appear in a separate employment agreement into the
covenants in the sale of business agreement so that the party to receive
the benefit of the noncompete may obtain the lowest standard of scrutiny
if its covenants are analyzed for enforceability by Georgia courts.47
C. Nonbinding Letter of Intent Incorporatedinto a Binding
Addendum Held Enforceable
In Goobich v. Waters,4" the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
nonbinding letter of intent, which the parties incorporated into a binding
addendum, was an enforceable contract.4 9 On November 29, 2004, Joel
Goobich and Gary and Teresa Waters entered into a nonbinding letter
of intent ("LOI"), which specified that Goobich would purchase the
Waterses' nursery business, Outdoor Environments, Inc.5" On December 30, 2004, the parties signed an addendum, which stated that "'itihe

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 592-93, 644 S.E.2d at 864-65.
Id. at 595-96, 644 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 593, 644 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 596, 644 S.E.2d at 866-67.
Id. at 595-96, 644 S.E.2d at 866.
283 Ga. App. 53, 640 S.E.2d 606 (2006).
Id. at 56-57, 640 S.E.2d at 609.
Id. at 54, 640 S.E.2d at 607-08.
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Non Binding LOI ... [was] binding on both parties"' subject to the
preparation and execution of closing documents. 5 ' When the Waterses
"requested that Goobich personally guarantee the earnout and bonus
amounts," a requirement not addressed in the LOI, the deal fell apart
and "Goobich sued the Waterses for breach of contract and specific
performance.'52
The court held that an enforceable contract requires agreement to all
of the essential terms and that the addendum, which incorporated the
nonbinding LOI as binding on the parties, covered all such terms.5 3
Furthermore, the court held that the addendum's requirement that the
parties execute closing documents did not destroy the validity of the
contract, but merely acted as a condition precedent to performance.54
D. Mere Payment of CorporateDebts Not Justificationfor Piercing
the Corporate Veil
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
in DaimlerChryslerFinancialServices Americas, LLC v. Nathan Mobley
Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Inc.," dealt with a suit by DaimlerChrysler
Financial Services Americas, LLC ("DaimlerChrysler") against a car
dealership, its owner, and others for breach of a loan agreement.56
Under the loan agreement, the dealership agreed to hold "all proceeds
from the sale or lease of its inventory . . . in trust for the benefit of
DaimlerChrysler." 57 Before the dealership ceased operations, it sold
over $340,000 worth of vehicles out of trust and .used the money to pay
other debts of the corporation.55 DaimlerChrysler argued that the court
should pierce the corporate veil and hold Nathan Mobley, the owner of
the dealership, personally liable for the breach of the loan agreement
because Mobley used the dealership as his "alter ego." 9 The court
rejected DaimlerChrysler's argument, holding that DaimlerChrysler
could not pierce the corporate veil because even though Mobley used the
funds from the sale of vehicles to satisfy other obligations of the
dealership, he did not abuse the corporate form to pay any of his

51.
52.
53.
54.
S.E.2d
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 55, 640 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 53, 55, 640 S.E.2d at 607, 608.
Id. at 56, 640 S.E.2d at 608-09.
Id. at 56-57, 640 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Brack v. Brownlee, 246 Ga. 818, 820, 273
390, 393 (1980)).
No. CIV A CV206-021, 2006 WL 3762087 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
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personal debts.6 ° This case reaffirms that alter ego claims must be
predicated on personal, rather than business, use of corporate monies
and that the shield of the corporate form is available to individuals who
use funds to pay valid debts of the corporation.
II.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

A. A Member of a Limited Liability Company Does Not Disassociate
Itself from a Limited Liability Company by Filing a Petition for
Disassociationof Another Member
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Sayers
v. Artistic Kitchen Design, LLC,62 held that a member of a limited
liability company did not disassociate itself from the limited liability
company by filing a petition for disassociation of another member.6 3
Timothy and Melissa Sayers and Robert and Valerie Landau were each
members of Artistic Kitchen Design, LLC ("AKD"). 4 The Landaus sued
the Sayerses for conversion of company property and filed a petition for
their membership
reorganization of AKD to divest the Sayerses of
65
interests under O.C.G.A. section 14-11-601.1(b)(5).
In rebuttal, the Sayerses argued that by filing the petition for
reorganization, the Landaus had disassociated themselves from AKD
and therefore no longer had standing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of
AKD. 66 The court rejected the Sayerses' standing argument based on
the plain language of O.C.G.A. section 14-11-601. 1(b)(4)(D), which states
that a person ceases to be a limited liability company member when
"'the member. . . files a petition or answer seeking for the member any
reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation,
dissolution, or similar relief.' ' 67 While the court noted that no case law
existed on the topic, it held that the plain text of the Georgia Limited
Liability Company Act,6" coupled with common sense, led to the

60. See id.
61. See generally id. See Boswell v. Primary Care Profls, P.C., 265 Ga. App. 522, 52627, 594 S.E.2d 725, 728-29 (2004) (holding that an alter ego claim failed because the
plaintiffs failed to show that the debts paid by the defendant were personal rather than
corporate debts).
62. 280 Ga. App. 223, 633 S.E.2d 619 (2006).
63. Id. at 224-25, 633 S.E.2d at 621.
64. Id. at 223, 633 S.E.2d at 620.
65. Id.; O.C.G.A § 14-11-601.1(b)(5) (2003 & Supp. 2007).
66. Sayers, 280 Ga. App. at 224, 633 S.E.2d at 620-21.
67. Id. at 224, 633 S.E.2d 620-21 (emphasis added by court) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-11601. 1(b)(4)(D)).
68. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (2003 & Supp. 2007).
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conclusion that filing a petition for reorganization does not result in the
disassociation of the filing member, rather it would only lead to the
disassociation of the member for whom the petition was filed. 9
B.

CorporateForm of Limited Liability Companies Upheld

In two cases decided during the survey period, Georgia courts upheld
the corporate form of limited liability companies.70 The Georgia Court
of Appeals, in Milk v. Total Pay & HR Solutions, Inc.,71 held that the
sole managing member of a limited liability company would not be held
personally liable for the debts of the limited liability company when
there is no evidence of (1) undercapitalization to avoid future debts or (2)
fraud by the member.7 2 On March 31, 2003, Joseph Milk formed
Burrito Joe's, as a Georgia limited liability company, and was the
company's sole managing member. A few months after formation, a
restaurant manager, on behalf of Burrito Joe's, signed a client service
agreement with the payroll company, Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc.
("Total Pay"). When Burrito Joe's ceased operations due to unprofitability, Total Pay sued Burrito Joe's and Milk to recover damages for the
payroll services provided.73 The court held that Milk could not be held
personally liable for the debts of Burrito Joe's because: (1) similar to the
protection of the corporate veil provided to shareholders of a corporation,
Georgia law recognizes that members of a limited liability company are
protected from personal liability arising from the debts of a properly
maintained limited liability company; (2) Georgia courts use great
caution before disregarding the corporate form of a limited liability
company; (3) Milk did not sign the client service agreement in any
capacity; (4) the $20,000 used to pay employees of the restaurant
appeared to be used for a legitimate business expenses and, in any case,
was not an undercapitalization with the intent to avoid future debts; and
(5) Total Pay provided no evidence of fraud or misuse of the corporate
form by Milk."
The court of appeals, in Global Diagnostic Development, LLC v.
Diagnostic Imaging of Atlanta,75 denied the plaintiff's, Diagnostic

69. See Sayers, 280 Ga. App. at 224-25, 633 S.E.2d at 621.
70. See generally Global Diagnostic Dev., LLC v. Diagnostic Imaging ofAtlanta, 284 Ga.
App. 66, 643 S.E.2d 338 (2007); Milk v. Total Pay & HR Solutions, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 449,
634 S.E.2d 208 (2006).
71. 280 Ga. App. 449, 634 S.E.2d 208 (2006).
72. Id. at 454, 634 S.E.2d at 213.
73. Id. at 449-50, 634 S.E.2d at 209-10.
74. See id. at 452-55, 634 S.E.2d at 212-13.
75. 284 Ga. App. 66, 643 S.E.2d 338 (2007).
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Imaging of Atlanta ("Diagnostic"), argument that the court should treat
North Atlanta Scan Associates, Inc. ("North Atlanta") and Global
Diagnostic Development, LLC ("Global") as a single entity because Dr.
Howard Rosing owned both companies.76 In this case, North Atlanta
did not obtain a certificate of need, as required by the Georgia Department of Community Health, to relocate its diagnostic imaging center.77
Global then applied for, and later received, a certificate of need
"proposing to purchase the equipment and assets of North Atlanta for
the purpose of operating a diagnostic imaging center at [the] same
location."" Diagnostic, a competitor of Global, challenged the sale as
a "sham transaction" because Dr. Rosing owned both companies. 79 The
court held that absent a showing of abuse, it would not disregard the
separate corporate forms of Global and North Atlanta, and would not
treat them as one company due to Dr. Rosing's sole ownership of both
entities.8 0

III.

PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY, AND JOINT VENTURES

A. Individuals Deemed Partnersand Personally Liable Under a
PartnershipAgreement When They Sign on Behalf of an Unformed
Entity
In Nationwide Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Troy Langley Construction
Co.,8' Nationwide Mortgage Services, Inc. ("Nationwide") and VentureCap Development, Inc. ("VentureCap") executed a lease purchase
agreement whereby VentureCap would purchase property located at
2000 Perry Boulevard (the "Property") from Nationwide. On February
23, 2001, Mike Roberts and Theodore Jockisch, both executives of
Nationwide, executed a partnership agreement on behalf of Perry
Limited, LLC ("Perry") with VentureCap in an effort to obtain financing2
to acquire the Property and construct town homes on the Property.1
However, although Roberts and Jockisch signed on behalf of Perry, Perry
had not 8 been
formed properly and was therefore referred to as "un3
formed."

76. Id. at 68-69, 643 S.E.2d at 341.
77. Id. at 66, 643 S.E.2d at 340.
78. Id. at 67, 643 S.E.2d at 340.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 69, 643 S.E.2d at 341.
81. 280 Ga. App. 539, 634 S.E.2d 502 (2006).
82. Id. at 539-40, 634 S.E.2d at 504.
83. Id. at 542 & n.4, 634 S.E.2d at 505-06 & n.4. While there is no explanation in
Nationwide, the authors surmise that the failure to file the certificate of formation was the
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On April 24, 2001, before VentureCap had acquired the Property,
VentureCap entered into a contract with Troy Langley Construction
Company, Inc. ("Langley") to demolish the structure on the Property.
After demolishing the structure and failing to recover payment from
VentureCap, Langley sued Nationwide for payment.8 4 Nationwide
counterclaimed, "asserting that it had never authorized the demolition
work and seeking to recover the value of the demolished property."85
Nationwide argued that because Perry was an unformed limited
liability company, the partnership agreement to acquire and develop the
Property between Nationwide's officers (who signed on behalf of Perry)
and VentureCap was invalid because the agreement contained language
that would automatically terminate the partnership upon the dissolution
of one partner.8 6 Rejecting Nationwide's argument, the court upheld
the validity of the partnership agreement and held that because the
limited liability company was never formed it could not be considered
dissolved. 7 Additionally, the court stated that it would treat Roberts
and Jockisch as partners under the agreement and treat them as if they
had signed the partnership agreement in their individual capacities
when they signed on behalf of Perry, the unformed limited liability
company.8 The court continued, holding that Roberts and Jockish
were separate legal persons from the company of which they were
officers, Nationwide.8 9 Lastly, the court concluded that factual issues
remained regarding "whether Nationwide acquiesced in and/or later
ratified VentureCap's" demolition of the structure on Nationwide's
property.90
One lesson from Nationwide is that parties signing on behalf of a
limited liability company should be cautious and confident that all
formation actions have been perfected. According to the decision in
Nationwide, signing behalf of an unformed limited liability company (or
other business entity for that matter) will subject the individual to
personal liability or an implied partnership under the agreement.

reason
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

the court in Nationwide considered Perry Limited, LLC an unformed LLC.
Id. at 539-40, 634 S.E.2d at 503-04.
Id. at 539, 634 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 542 & n.4, 634 S.E.2d at 505-06 & n.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542, 634 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 545, 634 S.E.2d at 508.
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B. Formation of an Agency Relationship Requires Action by the
Principal
Two Georgia cases decided during the survey period reconfirmed that
an agency relationship is created through the actions of the alleged
principal, not merely through the actions of the alleged agent." In
Ellis v. Fuller,92 Thomas Ellis sued Glen Fuller for refusing to release
Ellis's equipment from Fuller's building. Fuller argued that Ellis's son,
Anthony, acted as Ellis's agent in leasing Fuller's building, and
therefore, Fuller had a lien against the equipment for past rent owed by
Anthony.93 The court held that Anthony's actions, such as his comment
that he would have to get his father's permission before leasing the
building, were insufficient to create an agency relationship.94 According to the court, in order for Ellis to have been held liable for Anthony's
actions, Ellis would have had to have made a statement or taken other
steps to show that he gave Anthony the authority (actual or apparent)
to act on his behalf.95
In Satisfaction & Service Housing, Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank, Inc.,9"
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that no agency
relationship existed between SouthTrust Bank, Inc. ("SouthTrust") and
Bergen Acceptance Corporation ("Bergen").97 Satisfaction & Service
Housing, Inc. ("S&S") assigned a loan agreement to Bergen, who then
assigned the agreement to SouthTrust for a fee. Bergen filed for
bankruptcy after receiving payment from SouthTrust but before paying
S&S the money Bergen owed S&S. 9s S&S claimed "that SouthTrust
was liable to S&S for the money owed [by Bergen] because Bergen acted
as SouthTrust's agent and merely facilitated the loan purchase for
SouthTrust."9 9 Confirming the decision of the trial court, the court of
appeals determined that no apparent agency existed because S&S failed
to provide any evidence that SouthTrust took action to lead S&S to
believe Bergen was acting as SouthTrust's agent.'00 Even Bergen's use

91. Satisfaction & Serv. Hous., Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 711, 713,
642 S.E.2d 364, 365 (2007); Ellis v. Fuller, 282 Ga. App. 307, 309, 638 S.E.2d 433, 435
(2006).
92. 282 Ga. App. 307, 638 S.E.2d 433 (2006).
93. Id. at 307-08, 638 S.E.2d at 434.
94. Id. at 309, 638 S.E.2d at 435.
95. See id.
96. 283 Ga. App. 711, 642 S.E.2d 364 (2007).
97. Id. at 711, 642 S.E.2d at 365.
98. Id. at 712, 642 S.E.2d at 365.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 713-14, 642 S.E.2d at 366.
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of SouthTrust's name on the funding package and SouthTrust's funding
of past loans between Bergen and S&S was insufficient to create
apparent agency between Bergen and SouthTrust because of the lack of
any action by Southtrust, the alleged principal in this transaction, that
could be construed as its consent to Bergen's actions.''
The court in Satisfaction also held that no actual agency existed
between SouthTrust and Bergen. °2 The court held that in order to
prove actual agency, S&S needed to show "SouthTrust assumed the right
to control the time, manner, and method of Bergen's work."0 3 The
court held that neither Bergen's profits from loans sold to SouthTrust
nor SouthTrust's set criteria for acceptance of loans, such as minimum
credit scores, rose to the level of control required for the formation of an
actual agency relationship.'
The decisions in both Ellis and Satisfaction serve as practice pointers
to Georgia practitioners advising clients on agency law. Clients should
make certain that the representation on which they rely stems from an
action by a principal, not merely a claim of an agent, and they should
also make certain that such actions are relevant to the transaction at
issue, as opposed to prior unrelated activities.
C. Three Elements Required for the Formation of a Joint Venture in
Georgia
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
in Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Services, Inc., ° held that a joint
venture relationship existed between the defendants and, in so deciding,
succinctly laid out the elements required for the formation of a joint
venture under Georgia law as: "(1) a pooling of action; (2) a joint
undertaking for profit; and (3) rights of mutual control.' 0 6 In Hillis
the court quickly worked through the joint venture analysis and decided
that there was a joint venture because (1) the two parties bundled credit
services together, (2) there was an undertaking for profit, and (3) there
were provisions of the agreement between the two parties (which the
0 7
court did not cite) that provided "some amount of mutual control."
While the court's discussion in Hillis focused on the procedural issues of

101. Id.
102. Id. at 713, 642 S.E.2d at 365-66.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 237 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
106. Id. at 508.
107. See id. at 508-09.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

2007]

a class action case, Hillis is a helpful, concise review of the court's view
of the elements required for formation of a joint venture in Georgia.'
The court of appeals, in Kitchens v. Brusman, °9 provided additional
analysis regarding the requirements of a joint venture and focused the
majority of its discussion on the element of mutual control."' Following the death of his wife, Trammell Kitchens sued Dr. Harold Paul
Brusman, Dr. Brusman's practice, and Southern Regional Medical
System ("Southern Regional") for wrongful death due to misdiagnosis."' The court held no mutual control existed between Southern
Regional and Dr. Brusman's direct employer, South Suburban." 2
Supporting its holding, the court considered the fact that the contract
between Southern Regional and South Suburban specifically stated that
Southern Regional could not control the provision of services by South
Suburban and its pathologists." 3 Furthermore, the court stated that
the interdependency of the two businesses alone was 4insufficient to meet
the mutual control requirement of a joint venture. "
IV.

THE FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT'S BUSINESS CASE

DIVISION
As many corporate practitioners are aware, Fulton County Superior
Court's Business Case Division (the "Business Court") began operating
in October 2005 and was founded for the purpose of providing "judicial
attention and expertise to certain complex business cases and to
facilitate the timely and appropriate resolution of such disputes.""' 5
While the authors have not discussed the Business Court in previous
articles, the authors decided to include a brief section in this article
because, with recent amendments allowing parties to more freely
transfer cases to the Business Court, this court may see more activity
and become a practical and more available option for practitioners trying
complex business cases in Georgia.
By way of background, the Business Court only accepts cases that
have an amount in controversy of over $1,000,000 and implicate one of
the following:

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See generally id. at 508.
280 Ga. App. 163, 633 S.E.2d 585 (2006).
Id. at 167, 633 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 163-64, 633 S.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 167, 633 S.E.2d at 588.
Id.
Id.

115. Superior Court of Fulton County Business Court, http://www.fultoncourt.org/super
iorcourt/business-po.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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1. Georgia Securities Act of 1973, O.C.G.A. § 10-5-1
2. UCC, O.C.G.A. § 11-1-101
3. Georgia Business Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. § 14-2-101
4. Uniform Partnership Act, O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1
5. Uniform Limited Partnership Act, O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-1
6. Georgia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, O.C.G.A. § 149-100
7. Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100
[and]
8. Any other action that the parties and the Court believe warrants
assignment to the Business Court, including large contract and
116
business tort cases and other complex commercial litigation.

As a general rule, "Cases involving personal injury, wrongful death,
employment discrimination, or low-dollar consumer class action claims
...
are excluded from the Business Court unless all parties consent to
the transfer."11
Originally, cases could only be heard by the Business Court upon the
mutual agreement of the parties, which limited the utility of the
Business Court."" As of June 6, 2007, Rule 1004,119 governing the
Business Court, was amended to allow cases to be eligible for transfer
to the Business Court by (1) request of the superior court judge assigned
to the case or (2) a motion of one or both of the parties. 2 ° The new
amendments also provide for a twenty-day briefing period, during which
the opposing party may file its objection to the transfer.121 The
ultimate decision of whether the case will be transferred to the Business
Court is made by agreement of (1) the chief judge of the superior court,
(2) a member of the Business Court division committee (made up of

116. Id. (citing Georgia Securities Act of 1973, O.C.G.A. §§ 10-5-1 to -24 (2000 & Supp.
2007); Uniform Commercial Code, O.C.G.A. §§ 11-1-101 to -12-102 (2002); Georgia Business
Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (2003 & Supp. 2007); Uniform Partnership
Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 14-8-1 to -64 (2003); Georgia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9-100 to -1204 (2003 & Supp. 2007); Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-9A-1 to -130 (2003); Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 1411-100 to -1109 (2003 & Supp. 2007)).
117. Id.
118. Kirsten Tagami, Open for Business:New Fast-Track Fulton Court Tries to Fill a
Niche, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 12, 2006, at 1F.
119. FULTON COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 1004, availableat http://www.fultoncourt.org/super
iorcourt/pdf/business-court.pdf; see also Superior Court of Fulton County Business Court,
supra note 115. The Authors recognize that adoption of this rule falls a few days outside
of the survey period but have chosen to include it to provide a more accurate picture of the
Business Court.
120.

FULTON COUNTY SUPER. CT. R.

121.

Id.

1004.

20071
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and (3) a senior judge of the Business
three active superior court judges),
122
Court who may hear the case.
The Business Court resolved six cases in 2006, resolved three cases
through the first half of 2007, and has had only one case go to a jury
trial. 123 In June 2007, prior to the amendments to Rule 1004 noted
above, the Business Court had eighteen cases on its docket. 1 24 As of
September 2007, a mere three months after the amendments to Rule
1004 eased the requirements to transfer a case to the Business Court,
Court's case load has more than doubled to forty-one
the Business
25
cases. 1
V.

LEGISLATION

In the 2007 Session of the Georgia General Assembly, the Georgia
General Assembly made a number of revisions to the O.C.G.A., including
revisions to Title 7, regarding banking and finance; 12 Title 10, regarding commerce and trade; 1 27 and Title 14, regarding corporations. 128
Brief summaries of each the noteworthy revisions to Title 7 of the
O.C.G.A. are as follows:
1. The Georgia General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 7-14(35)(A) 129 to exclude "good will, core deposit intangibles, or other
of a
intangible assets related to the purchase, acquisition, or merger
130
bank charter" from the definition of "statutory capital base."

122. Id.
123. Greg Land, Rule Change Opens Business Court's Doors: Justices Order that Cases
Can Be Transferred if One Party, Judge Approve Move, DAILY REPORT, June 19, 2007, at
1A, 9A.
124. E-mails from Anne Nees, Staff Attorney, Georgia Business Court, to J. Haskell
Murray, Associate, King & Spalding LLP (Sept. 16, 2007, 19:34:08 EST and Sept. 17, 2007,
08:54 EST) (on file with authors).
125. Id.
126. See Ga. S. Bill 70, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-4, -286, -437, -530
to -537, -557, -601, -606, -608, -670, -681 to -683, -686, -687, -689, -689.1, -692, -700 to -702,
-704 to -707, -709, -1001, -1004, -1006, -1008, -1009, -1016 to -1018).
127. See Ga. H.R. Bill 240, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 10-1-7); Ga. S. Bill
203, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-350, -354, -357, 16-8-12; enacting
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-358).
128. See Ga. S. Bill 234, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-122, -2-1109, -9206.8, -9-1101, -11-906, -11-1101).
129. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-4(35)(A) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
130. Id. § 7-1-4(35)(A) (Supp. 2007).
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2. The Georgia General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. section 7-1286(a) 13 1 to require banks making "loans secured by improved
or
132
unimproved real estate" to comply with certain federal laws.
3. The Georgia General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 7-1437133 to allow for the electronic transmission of proxy by a person
lawfully entitled 3 to
attend a shareholders' meeting or by that person's
4
attorney in fact.1
4. The Georgia General Assembly amended multiple sections of the
in mergers or
O.C.G.A. to define, allow for, and govern share exchanges
35
consolidations involving banks or trust companies.1
5. The Georgia General Assembly revised various sections of the
O.C.G.A. regarding check sellers, including (1) multiple requirements
regarding licensing and qualifications to sell checks or money orders, 3 6
(2) authorization and a requirement to perform background checks on
37
employees and agents of check sellers,
and (3) a requirement to
13
maintain corporate security bonds.
6. The Georgia General Assembly revised and added multiple sections
to the O.C.G.A. regarding check cashers, including: (1) revising the
requirements for licensing and qualifications of check cashers;'39 (2)
providing the authorization and requirement to perform background
checks on applicants for check cashing licenses; 40 (3) revising provisions regarding notices, record-keeping, and procedures required of check
cashers;14 1 (4) adding a provision to set the maximum check cashing
fee at the greater of two percent of the amount of the check or two

131. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-286(a) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
132. Id. § 7-1-286(a) (Supp. 2007). The federal laws cited are:
provisions of Part 365 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's rules and
regulations, including 12 C.F.R. 365.1 and 365.2 and the Interagency Guidelines
for Real Estate Lending Policies in Appendix A and 12 C.F.R. 208.51 and the
guidelines contained in 12 C.F.R. Part 208 in the case of Federal Reserve member
banks.

Id.
133. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-437 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
134. Id. § 7-1-437 (Supp. 2007).
135. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-530 to -537, -557, -601, -606, -608 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
136. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-681 to -683, -686 to -687, -689 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
137. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-682(e) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
138. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-683(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). This section requires a $100,000
surety bond for check sellers and a $50,000 surety bond for money transmitters. Id. The
bond amount required increases by $5000 for each location for a maximum of $250,000.

Id.
139.
140.
141.

O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

§
§
§

7-1-701 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
7-1-702 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
7-1-705 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
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dollars;142 and (5) amending a section regarding the revocation or
suspension of a license to cash checks.' 43
7. The Georgia General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. section 7-11001(13)144 to clarify that a person making five or less mortgage loans
in a calendar year is not exempt from the licensing requirements for
mortgage lenders or brokers. 145 The Georgia General Assembly revised
O.C.G.A. section 7-1-1004(f)146 to authorize and 1require
background
47
checks on applicants for mortgage broker licenses.
8. The Georgia General Assembly revised O.C.G.A. section 7-11016148 to regulate advertising for mortgage loans requiring that such
advertisements (1) "may not be false, misleading, or deceptive"; (2) may
not "indicate or imply that its interest rates or charges for loans are in
any way 'recommended,' 'approved,' 'set,' or 'established' by the state"; (3)
may not contain publicly available information about an individual's
loan without "clearly and conspicuously ... in bold-faced type at the
beginning of the advertisement" stating that the information was not
provided by the individual's lender and that the advertiser is not
affiliated with the lender; and (4) must "contain the name,49 license
number, and an office address of [the] licensee or registrant."
Also in the 2007 Session, Article 1 of Chapter 1 of Title 10 of the
O.C.G.A., 5 ° regarding retail installment and home solicitation sales,
was amended to increase the maximum delinquency charge for
installment payments that are ten or more days overdue from eighteen
dollars to twenty-five dollars.' 5 '
Finally, the Georgia General Assembly amended Title 14 of the
O.C.G.A. to require Georgia corporations, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies to file a certificate of conversion 5 with
the
2
Secretary of State when the entity converts to foreign status.

142. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-706(b) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
143. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-707 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
144. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1001(13) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
145. Id. § 7-1-1001(13) (Supp. 2007).
146. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1004(f) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
147. Id. § 7-1-1004(f) (Supp. 2007).
148. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1016 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
149. Id. § 7-1-1016 (Supp. 2007).
150. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-1 to -16 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
151. See Ga. H.R. Bill 240, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 10-1-7).
152. See Ga. S. Bill 234, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-122, -2-1109, -9206.8, -9-1101, -11-906, -11-1101).

